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The DOMEX challenge is to turn 
digital bits into actionable intelligence.
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A computer used by Al Qaeda ends up in the hands of a 
Wall Street Journal reporter. A laptop from Iran is discov-
ered that contains details of that country’s nuclear weap-
ons program. Photographs and videos are downloaded 
from terrorist Web sites. 
As evidenced by these and countless other cases, digital 
documents and storage devices hold the key to many 
ongoing military and criminal investigations. The most 
straightforward approach to using these media and docu-
ments is to explore them with ordinary tools—open the 
word files with Microsoft Word, view the Web pages with 
Internet Explorer, and so on.
Although this straightforward approach is easy to 
understand, it can miss a lot. Deleted and invisible files 
can be made visible using basic forensic tools. Programs 
called carvers can locate information that isn’t even a 
complete file and turn it into a form that can be readily 
processed. Detailed examination of e-mail headers and 
log files can reveal where a computer was used and other 
computers with which it came into contact. Linguistic 
tools can discover multiple documents that refer to the 
same individuals, even though names in the different 
documents have different spellings and are in different 
human languages. Data-mining techniques such as cross-
drive analysis can reconstruct social networks—automati-
cally determining, for example, if the computer’s previous 
user was in contact with known terrorists. This sort of 
advanced analysis is the stuff of DOMEX, the little-known 
intelligence practice of document and media exploitation. 
The U.S. intelligence community defines DOMEX as 
“the processing, translation, analysis, and dissemination 
Exploitation
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of collected hard-copy documents and electronic media, 
which are under the U.S. government’s physical control 
and are not publicly available.”1 That definition goes on 
to exclude “the handling of documents and media dur-
ing the collection, initial review, and inventory process.” 
DOMEX is not about being a digital librarian; it’s about 
being a digital detective. 
Although very little has been disclosed about the 
government’s DOMEX activities, in recent years academic 
researchers—particularly those concerned with electronic 
privacy—have learned a great deal about the general 
process of electronic document and media exploitation. 
My interest in DOMEX started while studying data left on 
hard drives and memory sticks after files had been deleted 
or the media had been “formatted.” I built a system to 
automatically copy the data off the hard drives, store it 
on a server, and search for confidential information. In 
the process I built a rudimentary DOMEX system. Other 
recent academic research in the fields of computer foren-
sics, data recovery, machine translation, and data mining 
is also directly applicable to DOMEX.
This article introduces electronic document and media 
exploitation from that academic perspective. It presents 
a model for performing this kind of exploitation and dis-
cusses some of the relevant academic research. Properly 
done, DOMEX goes far beyond recovering documents 
from hard drives and storing them in searchable archives. 
Understanding this engineering problem gives insight 
that will be useful for designing any system that works 
with large amounts of unstructured, heterogeneous data. 
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When researchers say that their work is centered on infor-
mation or document “exploitation,” eyebrows invariably 
raise. The word exploitation is provocative, attracting 
unwarranted attention to a process that could just as 
easily be classified as “computer forensics” or even “data 
recovery.” But, in fact, the word is apropos.
The words exploit and exploitation imply using some-
thing in a manner that’s “unfair or selfish.”2 And it’s true. 
People who are in the business of document and media 
exploitation really do seek to make unfair use of com-
puter documents and electronic storage devices. Fair, after 
all, means following the rules. The “rules” of a computer 
system are the APIs, the data-storage standards, the file 
permissions, and other interfaces that were intended to 
be used by the file’s creator. When a file in the computer’s 
electronic trash is deleted by “emptying the trash,” the 
rules say that the file’s contents should no longer be 
accessible. The “undelete” command that is part of every 
forensic toolkit takes advantage of the fact that com-
puter systems generally do not overwrite the contents 
of deleted files. This is a common problem in computer 
systems, affecting not only deleted files in file systems but 
also deleted paragraphs in word processors and even unal-
located pages in virtual memory systems. 
Computer forensic practitioners working for police 
departments and litigation support firms also make their 
living by recovering intentionally deleted data, but even 
these processes follow rules—though those involved in 
exploitation might choose to ignore them. The goal of 
computer forensics is to assist in some kind of investiga-
tion, which usually begins because a crime was com-
mitted and, hopefully, ends with the perpetrator being 
convicted in a court of law. With conviction as a goal, 
forensic practitioners must be concerned with the eviden-
tiary integrity and chain of custody—and they need to 
limit their search to information that is relevant to that 
investigation. In many cases the evidence will have been 
obtained under a search warrant or discovery procedure, 
the terms of which may limit the forensic examiner’s 
actions or even which kinds of files may be examined. 
Evidence obtained by breaking the rules may even be 
suppressed. 
For example, in the case of U.S. v. Carey, an investi-
gator executing a warrant on narcotics discovered files 
with a JPG extension that contained child pornography. 
Carey was indicted and convicted for possession of child 
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pornography, but the appellate court reversed the ruling 
and remanded the case back to the trial court, arguing 
that “the seizure of evidence was beyond the scope of the 
warrant.”3 The evidence should have been suppressed. 
Unlike the investigators in the Carey case, those 
engaged in document and media exploitation are not 
bound by any rules other than laws of physics and 
nature. The goal of information exploitation is to get and 
use the data—the ends justify the means. It’s OK if these 
results aren’t good enough for a conviction. Exploitation 
rarely seeks to prove or disprove the details of a case; 
instead, it seeks to make the fullest use of all the data that 
has been obtained. The standard of success is the useful-
ness of the result, not the 
reliability of the process.
If you find the preced-
ing paragraph alarming, 
remember that DOMEX 
is about exploiting data, 
not people. “Exploitation” 
is precisely the attitude 
that you want when you 
take a crashed hard drive 
to a data-recovery firm. If 
you’ve just lost the only copy of a 400-page manuscript, 
it’s probably OK with you if the firm is able to recover 
the first 200 pages of the September 20 version and the 
last 180 pages of the August 19 version. Although a good 
defense attorney might be able to suppress a document 
that was made by stitching together those two halves, 
you probably don’t care about that if you are the author 
and the alternative is rewriting the 400 pages from 
memory. Likewise, if you are using some kind of desktop 
search system to index the files on your hard drive, you 
don’t mind if the product makes a mistake or two and 
shows you files that you aren’t “allowed” to see—just as 
long as you find what you’re searching for. 
tHE tWO DOMEx PRObLEMS
Broadly speaking, DOMEX addresses two problems, 
which we will call “deep” and “broad.”
The deep problem is the easier of the two to under-
stand. Some kind of document or data-storage device—for 
example, a hard drive, DVD, or cellphone—becomes 
available for analysis. Because of the way that this object 
was obtained, we know that it is of interest. The goal is to 
find out everything possible about it.
A good example of the deep problem is the analysis 
of two hard drives stolen from Al Qaeda’s central office 
in Kabul on November 12, 2001. The hard drives were in 
a laptop and desktop that Alan Cullison, a war corre-
spondent working for the Wall Street Journal, purchased 
in Kabul.4 Analysis revealed that the desktop had been 
used primarily by Ayman al-Zawahiri, one of Al Qaeda’s 
top leaders. After Cullison verified that the computers 
were legitimate, he turned them over to U.S. intelligence 
officials. The analysts who were given those devices 
presumably wanted to know everything possible about 
them—not just the documents, but the application 
programs, the configuration settings, the other computers 
with which these machines had come into contact, and 
so on. Although few details of how these computers were 
analyzed have been made public, it would be logical to 
assume that every applica-
ble forensic and document 
analytic tool in the U.S. 
arsenal was applied to the 
machines. 
Another example of 
the deep problem is the 
analysis of a stolen Iranian 
laptop obtained by the U.S. 
government in July 2005. 
According to the New York 
Times, the laptop contained “more than a thousand pages 
of Iranian computer simulations and accounts of experi-
ments” that “showed a long effort to design a nuclear 
warhead.”5 Once again, an analyst faced with examining 
this laptop would want to know everything about it that 
was technically and humanly possible. 
The broad DOMEX problem flips things around. 
Instead of having unlimited resources to spend on a 
particular document, analysts are given a large number 
of digital objects and a limited amount of time to find 
something useful to an investigation. In recent years the 
amount of digital information seized during the course 
of law enforcement, intelligence, and even during civil 
litigation has exploded. “Ten years ago, a case would 
involve a few computer hard drives,” e-discovery expert 
Jack Seward said in 2005. “Now a case is often hundreds 
of hard drives, numerous servers, and tape archives.”6 
Indeed, a single case processed by the FBI’s North Texas 
Regional Computer Forensics Laboratory in 2002 required 
more than 8.5 terabytes of storage and more than a 
month of computer work to process.7
This avalanche of digital media makes the broad 
problem quite compelling from both a national security 
and commercial perspective: a system that can reliably 
find the “good stuff” can save money, time, and perhaps 
even lives. 
Remember that DOMEX 
is about exploiting 
data, not people. 
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Although these two problems may seem on the surface 
to be quite different, both require many of the same tools 
and technologies. Applying either approach to a hard 
drive requires software that can interpret disk structures 
for a wide range of operating systems and their different 
versions. The naïve way to do this is by mounting the 
disk partition read-only; a better approach is to use foren-
sic file system recovery software such as The Sleuth Kit.8
Such software knows how to decode on-disk file system 
structures, can recover deleted files, and is tolerant of data 
structures that might be missing or corrupt. 
File recovery is just one of many required techni-
cal capabilities. Once files are recovered, software needs 
to extract salient “names and entities” such as human 
names, e-mail addresses, physical addresses, and so on. 
The software needs to be able to recognize variant spell-
ings or codings for the same information. The system will 
probably need to build some kind of hypothesis about 
what kinds of processes inside the computer system cre-
ated the stored data in the first place. Finally, the software 
must be able systematically to organize the information 
so that it can be automatically processed. 
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The intelligence community’s emphasis on translation,
analysis, and dissemination in its DOMEX definition is 
no accident. Much of the work on DOMEX grows out of 
previous work on DOCEX (document exploitation). Com-
mercial DOCEX systems have been available to the U.S. 
government since the 1990s.9
Today there is still significant emphasis on documents, 
and on the information created by human beings. This 
is especially true when DOMEX information is presented 
in a criminal or civil trial. In a courtroom the prosecution 
can easily take a printout of an e-mail message or a digital 
photograph found on a hard drive and enter it into evi-
dence. Certainly one reason that the Al Qaeda hard drive 
was valuable is that it contained correspondence with 
Osama bin Laden and other Al Qaeda leaders.
Technical content can be equally valuable. For 
example, an analyst might discover a link between two 
women because both women have photographs of the 
same man on their respective hard drives. Another way 
of discovering that link might be by determining that 
the two women both have digital photographs that 
came from the same digital camera (as identified by a 
serial number in an EXIF file) or because their copies of 
Windows XP were activated with the same stolen serial 
number. Information generated by a computer, such as a 
digital camera’s serial number embedded in a JPEG EXIF 
record, might be critical in establishing a link between 
two individuals And unlike the analyst who recognizes 
the same man, the technical connection can be made 
automatically—even if the two hard drives are analyzed at 
two different locations—provided that there is a correla-
tion step done at a central location. 
Extracting technical information is complicated 
because many file formats are either proprietary or poorly 
documented. This kind of analysis is also rare among 
today’s commercial forensic tools, which tend to focus 
on document recovery and presentation of data from a 
single drive. For example, a data-mining algorithm that 
discovers that an unprintable fragment of a PDF file has 
a common “ancestor” with another PDF file would prob-
ably not be useful in a court of law: explaining to a jury 
what such a match actually means would be difficult. 
Finding one of those PDF files on a captured laptop and 
another on a terrorist Web site, however, might be useful 
in helping an analyst understand how information flows 
through an organization. 
The analysis of technical content is likely to grow 
more important in the coming years as the widespread 
availability of disk and file encryption makes human-
generated content harder to access, just as the widespread 
use of encryption for communications increases the 
importance of traffic analysis for communications intel-
ligence.10
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AUtOMAtED DOMEx
In the remainder of this article, I present an architecture 
for performing automated document and media exploi-
tation and show how the architecture can be applied to 
both the deep and broad problems of DOMEX. Although 
I use the example of a hard drive that arrives for exploita-
tion, much of the discussion could apply equally well to a 
DVD or USB flash storage device.
Step 1: ImagINg aND Storage
When a hard drive first becomes available for exploita-
tion, its condition is generally unknown. The drive might 
be in perfect working order. On the other hand, the drive 
may have been damaged or about to fail and may have 
only a few minutes of operational life left. Therefore, 
when a drive arrives for exploitation, the drive’s contents 
are typically copied to a high-capacity storage system 
such as a RAID or SAN (storage area network). This pro-
cess is called imaging, and the tool to perform this task is 
called a disk imager.
A number of disk imagers have been developed for use 
by police departments and other computer forensic inves-
tigators. These programs make a sector-for-sector disk copy 
into one or more evidence files on the storage system. 
Most forensic disk imagers will also calculate an MD5 
or SHA-1 cryptographic hash of both the original disk 
and the image: by comparing the two the investigator can 
establish the faithfulness of the copy. In a criminal inves-
tigation this hash is recorded in a police or investigator’s 
report; if the disk image is later provided to an expert 
working for the defense, that expert can verify that the 
disk image the defense team received is the same as the 
one acquired by the police. 
A comprehensive list of disk imagers is available on 
the Forensics Wiki.11
The following additional features are desirable when a 
disk imager is used for DOMEX: 
•  The imager should be as automated as possible because 
of the potentially large number of disks that need to be 
processed.
•  The imager should capture metadata about the hard 
drive such as its serial number, manufacturer, and firm-
ware version, and handle bad sectors. (Some so-called 
bad sectors can nevertheless be read by turning off error 
correction; others can’t. Some bad drives can even crash 
your host computer when you try to spin up the drive.)
•  The imager should incorporate workflow automation 
features such as choosing a file name and storage loca-
tion for the image file and detecting if the same drive 
has been inadvertently imaged before. 
•  In some applications, encrypting the image file with a 
public key may be desirable so the contents cannot be 
decrypted except in a secure facility. 
Even though imaging is well-understood technology, 
many improvements are possible. Today’s imagers need 
to be faster, more highly automated, and better able to 
handle disk errors. There is also a need for handheld 
imagers and covert imagers, as well as tools that can 
begin analysis before imaging is complete.
Step 2: FIle SyStem aNalySIS
A 60-gigabyte hard drive has 120 million 512-byte sec-
tors, but thinking about the drive this way isn’t terribly 
efficient or useful. Most hard drives have one or more 
partitions that may be one or more file systems. Each file 
system, in turn, has files that are resident and files that 
have been deleted but are nevertheless recoverable. This 
kind of extraction can be done with an open source tool 
such as The Sleuth Kit.
Once the file system metadata is extracted, it should 
be intelligently processed and stored in a common data-
base. Documents can also be tokenized and indexed. Such 
a system makes it possible to rapidly search hundreds or 
thousands of disks by typing a single command. 
After the disk’s metadata has been extracted, a poten-
tially large amount of data may nevertheless remain. This 
data comes from the sectors found between or at the end 
of partitions, sectors that were not ascribable to any file, 
and even bytes in the slack space at the ends of sectors 
and clusters. Forensic investigators who come up empty 
looking for incriminating information among the disk’s 
files will typically use a carving tool such as Scalpel or 
Foremost to search through this additional space for digi-
tal images, word documents, and whatever other kinds of 
useful information they can find. 
Although file-system analysis is a part of practically 
every civil and criminal forensic examination today, most 
of today’s tools are designed for interactive analysis and 
do not work well in a batch environment. This is an area 
where research, engineering, and product development 
can have significant impact.
Another area where research is needed is in improving 
performance. Today’s analysis tools, much like today’s 
file systems, frequently rely on the head of the comput-
er’s hard drive for seeking information. Processing the 
contents of an entire hard drive (or hard-drive image) 
might involve a seek to every directory and then to every 
file—and that’s before the carving starts. The problem 
here is that both disk capacities and data-transfer times 
are increasing much faster than the speed with which 
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hard drives can seek. As a result, a highly fragmented 
disk that can be imaged in an hour frequently might 
require 15 to 20 hours for the initial analysis—even if 
the image is stored on a high-performance SAN. A good 
research problem in the area of file-system analysis is 
the development of analysis software that operates in a 
streaming mode, reading the disk image from beginning 
to end and performing all necessary data analysis as the 
data flies by.
STEP 3: FILE ANALYSIS AND FEATURE EXTRACTION
Once the files are found, they need to be analyzed—auto-
matically, if possible.
Today’s computer forensic systems excel at docu-
ment analysis, but only when used by a trained opera-
tor. Commercial “file filter” software is available that 
can understand, display on the screen, and extract the 
text from literally hundreds of different kinds of appli-
cation data file formats. Once data is extracted, it can 
be processed with linguistic tools that can detect the 
language in which the document is written, translate the 
text into English (if necessary), or transliterate names and 
addresses into a standardized English spelling. The origi-
nal language, the translations, and the transliterations 
can then all be stored in a full-text search engine, making 
it easy for a human analyst to rapidly search thousands of 
processed hard drives for a specific word or term. 
Full-blown automated exploitation can go much 
further than simple indexing, of course. For example, hid-
den data from previous edit sessions is frequently left in 
Microsoft Word files; this data can also be automatically 
extracted and indexed.12 Other information found in the 
metadata includes the time that edits took place and the 
registered name of the person performing the edits. JPEG 
image files record such details as the serial number of 
the camera that was used and the time of day; the JPEG 
format even has provisions for recording the GPS location 
of each photograph; logfiles found on virtually every hard 
drive can be used to build a network-centric map of the 
computer’s electronic neighborhood. All of this infor-
mation can be faked—but usually it isn’t. Analysts can 
extract, archive, and exploit all this information.
For work that involved documenting privacy viola-
tions on discarded hard drives,13 we wrote a program that 
could automatically find character sequences that had a 
high probability of being credit card numbers. Applying 
this program to a corpus of 150 hard drives, we could 
rapidly distinguish the few drives that had thousands 
of credit card numbers from the large number of drives 
that had hardly any. We then focused our investigation 
on these “hot drives.” One of these drives had been used 
in an ATM before it was sold on eBay; another drive had 
been taken from a computer used for processing credit 
cards at a supermarket. Neither disk had been erased prior 
to being sold.
A surprising amount of both applied and basic 
research needs to be done in this area. Although some 
commercial and open source tools are available for data 
extraction, nearly all of them focus on extracting human-
readable text rather than metadata that might be useful 
for secondary analysis. What’s more, extraction software 
invariably lags behind the file formats used by commer-
cial applications. For example, many open source pro-
grams can now process the OLE format used by Microsoft 
Word, Excel, and PowerPoint. Unfortunately, Microsoft is 
now moving to Office XML. 
People engaged in criminal or terrorist activity may 
employ obsolete or obscure word processors, spread-
sheets, and image file formats as alternatives to using 
encryption. This is because the presence of encrypted data 
may be a red flag, attracting the attention of an investiga-
tor. Data in oddball file formats, on the other hand, may 
simply be ignored by the average investigator unless there 
is reason to dig deeper. Thus, oddball file formats provide 
a kind of plausible deniability to those who are trying to 
hide the content of their communications.
Another research challenge is to develop automated 
software that can understand the data files on a hard 
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drive the first time they are encountered, without requir-
ing someone to sit down and write a parser. Although 
this sounds like a fantasy, it really isn’t. That’s because the 
typical hard drive contains more than just data files—it 
also has the programs that process those data files. In 
theory, it should be possible to load those programs into 
a virtual machine, run them, and then have the pro-
grams read and process the document files. Many security 
researchers are now using this sort of approach for mal-
ware analysis. It should be usable for DOMEX as well.
Step 4: aNomaly DetectIoN aND  
SocIal Network aNalySIS
At this point in the process, the data from the hard drive 
has been extracted, sliced, refactored, translated into mul-
tiple representations, and stored in multiple databases. 
Now the real work begins.
For the deep DOMEX problem, automated software 
should be able to perform an analysis that’s at least as 
thorough as an analysis created by one or more humans. 
This is because the deep software can have access to a far 
greater store of forensic knowledge and techniques than 
even the most renowned investigator. Automated soft-
ware, running with an appropriate database, can know 
practically every version of every program that has ever 
been sold commercially. It can create a detailed hypoth-
esis of the ways that the suspect’s hard drive must have 
been used, then look for additional evidence on the drive 
(or on the Internet) to support that hypothesis. Unlike an 
expensive forensic investigator, this automated software 
could be widely deployed within both the intelligence 
and law enforcement communities—assuming, of course, 
that someone would write it.
Automated software should also be able to excel at the 
broad DOMEX problem. A DOMEX facility that stores fea-
tures from thousands of hard drives in a single database 
could perform large-scale correlations of features such as 
e-mail addresses or credit card numbers. This approach, 
called cross-drive analysis,14 could determine if a particu-
lar hard drive was used by a person who has connections 
to a previously identified terrorist network. Alternatively, 
cross-drive analysis could be used to find a terrorist net-
work in a sea of data from captured drives.
This database of the current information environment 
can also improve deep analysis. For example, finding 
scanned pages from an Al Qaeda training manual on a 
hard drive might be an important event—unless it’s the 
manual that was discovered by the Manchester (England) 
Metropolitan Police and now resides on the U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice Web site.15 On the other hand, finding 
a file that matches the first 25 pages of the Department 
of Justice manual but then has divergent text might be 
exceedingly important.
Step 5: reportINg
Once the automated analysis is complete, the results need 
to be made available to others—investigators, analysts, or 
even the ultimate consumer of the intelligence product. 
Today these reports are created by human analysts who 
tailor the report for the needs and knowledge of the 
intended recipient. Not surprisingly, generating a report 
can be time consuming—sometimes more so than the 
actual analysis.
An automated DOMEX system could generate its 
own reports. These reports could be superior to current 
forensic reports, taking into account not just the subject 
material and the report’s intended consumer, but also 
what information has already been reported to the con-
sumer. That is, the DOMEX system could track each user’s 
knowledge and fill in the gaps as necessary.
SEARCH AND RESEARCH 
Each successive step in this hypothetical automated 
DOMEX system is further and further advanced from the 
current state of the art. Open source imaging, file extrac-
tion, and file-carving software are available from a variety 
of Web sites, but the reporting scenario described here is 
many years from being a usable technology. 
Some civil libertarians have said they have reserva-
tions about the moral legitimacy of this work. Automated 
DOMEX systems, they fear, could easily become better 
surveillance tools for the masses. DOMEX software could 
be run covertly on desktop computers by large corpora-
tions, for example. Software that has the potential to be 
this invasive should not be developed, they argue.
Automated DOMEX software, however, actually has 
the power to improve privacy—not so much for the 
general public, but for people who are targets of investiga-
tion. Today there are far more disk drives to be analyzed 
than there are examiners to work with them. The result is 
delays that can both dangerously impede an investigation 
and damage the civil liberties of innocent suspects.
For example, in 2005 the United Kingdom passed 
legislation extending the time that terrorism suspects 
could be held without being charged from 14 days to 
90 days, in part because the two weeks provided by the 
previous terrorism law did not provide sufficient time for 
the forensic analysis of a typical hard drive.16 A high-con-
fidence automated DOMEX system might give police the 
tools they need to clear a suspect in days, if not hours. 
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As framed here, the DOMEX problem is very unstruc-
tured. You have a pile of data that intuition tells you is 
important. The challenge is to do something useful with 
it—ideally with as much automation as possible.
This kind of broad, unstructured problem makes scien-
tists uncomfortable, since there is no hypothesis to test. 
It makes businesspeople uncomfortable because there is 
no obvious metric to measure success or failure. But this 
kind of unstructured problem dominates many of today’s 
information-rich environments.
We have the data, but getting the data isn’t the hard 
part—it’s just the start. 1
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